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The mystery of Polemon has been a concern to me ever since I began to 
take an interest in the Old Academy after Plato, an interest which goes back, 
to at least a certain extent, all the way to the mid-1970’s. At the time of 
composing The Middle Platonists (1977), I was moved to remark (p. 40) that 
though Polemon “administered the Academy for over fifty years, and 
certainly left a mark on it, .. of the nature of that mark we are miserably ill-
informed.” The ‘fifty years’ is, it must be said, a slight exaggeration. Polemo 
was scholarch from 314 to 267, which gives us 47 years -- but no matter; the 
point is valid enough. 
I do note, of course, that such sources as we have put a strong emphasis 
on practical ethics, and I quote Diogenes Laertius on the topic (IV 18): 
“Polemon used to say that we should exercise ourselves with facts 
(pragmata), and not with logical speculations (dialektika theôrêmata), 
which leave us, like a man who has got up some paltry handbook on 
harmony but never practised, able, indeed, to win admiration for skill in 
asking questions (erôtêsis), but utterly at variance with ourselves in the 
ordering of our lives (diathesis).” (trans. Hicks). 
This is certainly the remark of a man who has due contempt for abstract 
theorizing in an area where the quality of practical activity is crucial, and it 
may well reflect the overall attitude to theoretical philosophy of our subject 
today, but I do not think that it can be the whole story.  
Two larger questions seem to me to arise as background to any inquiry 
into the nature of Polemon’s place in the Platonic tradition. The first is what it 
means to be a Platonist at all; and the second is the extent to which the 
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Stoicism of Zeno of Kition and his successors can reasonably be viewed – in 
the way that it was viewed by Antiochus of Ascalon, for example1 --  as a sort 
of ‘correction’, or ‘tidying-up’, of the teachings of Polemon. 
On the first question, I must say that I have been most attracted of late 
by a bold formulation of Lloyd Gerson, in a new book of his on a subject that 
he has been worrying away at for some time now,2 concerning the basic 
characteristics of what he wants to term ‘Ur-Platonism’ (UP). He chooses to 
express this as a set of negativities, tendencies in philosophy that Plato is 
against. They are as follows: anti-materialism, anti-mechanism, anti-nominalism, 
anti-relativism, and anti-scepticism. Gerson does not wish to claim that these 
‘anti’s were ever formalized by Plato as such, or that they constituted any 
kind of creed to which members of the Academy had to swear allegiance; 
simply that these negativities were a sort of framework within which Plato 
and those who became his companions were content to work.  
In connection with Polemon -- and indeed certain other members of the 
Academy, such as Philip of Opus and Heraclides of Pontus – the most 
interesting of these ‘taboos’ is ‘materialism’. As far as Plato was concerned, 
the materialism which he opposed would have been above all the atomism of 
Leucippus and Democritus, which also involved ‘mechanism’.  What I would 
like to suggest, in the context of Polemon, is that such arguable ‘material’ 
entities as the Aristotelian aither, or indeed the ‘craftsmanly’ or ‘intellectual’ 
fire (pyr tekhnikon, noeron) of the Stoics would not necessarily fall under the 
Platonist ban, and that thus it becomes a permissible option to adopt such a 
concept as aither to serve as the substance of the heavenly bodies, the soul, 
and even of God; but more of that presently. 
The second question is one which is central for evaluating the project of 
Antiochus of Ascalon in the 1st cent. B.C. Antiochus, as is by now well enough 
known,3 bases his return to a dogmatic system of Platonism on the premiss 
                                                 
1 Cf.  Cic. Acad, I  35; 43.. 
2 From Plato to Platonism, Ch. 1 (forthcoming). 
3 In this connection, I have been deriving much stimulation recently by a reading of a number of the 
papers contained in The Philosophy of Antiochus, ed. David Sedley (Cambridge, 2012), specifically 
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that Zeno, in founding Stoicism, is simply engaged on a kind of ‘re-vamping’ 
of the brand of Platonism being promulgated by Polemon and his associates 
in the final stage of Old Academic period, during the first two decades of the 
third century. The issue is whether he is engaging here in some wholesale 
deception, or self-deception, or whether, after all, he (who is likely to have 
known a great deal more about the Old Academy than we can ever do) has 
some solid basis for his postulate. I would like to suggest that the truth here 
lies, as so often, somewhere in the middle between two extreme positions: the 
acceptance at face value of all of Antiochus’ claims, so far as we can discern 
them; and what one may call the ‘Barnesian’ position,4 that the whole concept 
of the revived ‘Old Academy’ and its wide-ranging concordance with 
Stoicism is a fantasy and a fabrication by Antiochus. It seems to me quite 
probable that Antiochus is massaging the evidence to some extent, in order to 
maximize the degree of concordance (though he is not behind-hand either in 
criticizing the Stoics when he feels they have deviated from the Old Academic 
tradition!),5 but that he could not have advanced his theory at all, had he not 
had at least some stimulus to it from his knowledge of the philosophical 
positions of Xenocrates and, in particular, Polemon. 
 
That said, let us turn briefly to look at the biographical details on 
Polemon as preserved in Diogenes Laertius – probably borrowed by him in 
large part from the Hellenistic gossip-columnist Antigonus of Carystus, who 
was a virtual contemporary (fl. c. 240 B.C.), and thus not entirely devoid of 
credibility.6 Antigonus gives us the – presumably reliable – ‘hard’ facts that 
Polemon was the son of one Philostratus, of the deme of Oea, who was a very 
                                                                                                                                           
those of Roberto Polito, Sedley himself, Charles Brittain, Brad Inwood, George Boys-Stones, David 
Blank, and Mauro Bonazzi (though all the papers are excellent in their ways). 
4 That is to say, the position adopted by Jonathan Barnes, particularly in his essay ‘Antiochus of 
Ascalon’, in Philosophia Togata, edd. M. Griffin & J. Barnes, Oxford, 1989. 
5 As, of course, he is prepared to criticize Aristotle and Theophrastus when they deviate, despite his 
stance on the essential unity of the Academy and the Peripatos (cf. e.g.Cic. Acad. I 33). 
6 DL drops his name à propos of some slightly later details, but it is plain from a more or less parallel 
passage in Philodemus’ History of the Academy (cols. IV 40 –XIII 10) that Antigonus is responsible for 
the earlier details as well. 
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prominent member of Athenian society (prôtos tôn politôn), and kept a stable 
of horses for chariot-racing (harmatotrophêsai) – this detail being presumably 
selected as a characteristic mark of great wealth. Philostratus does not seem to 
figure in the contemporary inscriptional record, so he may have avoided 
public life, and stuck to the tendance of his horses! At any rate, that is more or 
less the last hard fact we are going to get; the rest of our information comes 
under the category of anecdote – though that is not to say that useful 
information may not be derived from it. 
. These anecdotes fall into two sections: those that concern Polemon’s 
earlier life of dissipation, and those which concern his notable austerity 
following his conversion. 
As to the former group, as I was reading over the account of Polemon’s 
conversion to philosophy, something possibly significant struck me, which 
had not done so previously. This is a very popular anecdote, of which Gigante 
is able to list fully 19 versions in his collection of the ‘fragments,’’7 which 
involves Polemon, who at this stage is a notorious rake, on the head of an 
agreement with his young friends (synthemenos tois neois) – presumably some 
sort of wager was involved – lurching into Xenocrates’ seminar, drunk and 
garlanded (methyôn kai estephanômenos), with the purpose, we must imagine, 
of causing some sort of mayhem, and discomfiting the notoriously 
unflappable Xenocrates. Instead, however, Polemon slumps down at the back 
of the lecture-room, and finds himself listening to Xenocrates calmly 
continuing to deliver a lecture on sôphrosynê, which results in his becoming 
hooked on philosophy as a way of life, the bios philosophikos. 
What struck me, as I say, on re-reading this story, is the ‘drunk and 
garlanded’ bit. Now no doubt young Athenian rakes, lurching around town 
on a kômos, tended generally to be drunk and garlanded, but one cannot help 
thinking of the very similar arrival of Alcibiades at Agathon’s intellectual 
dinner party in the Symposium (212E), also methyôn kai estephanômenos. Could 
it be that the purveyors of this anecdote, acquainted as they would be both 
                                                 
7 M. Gigante, Polemonis Academici Fragmenta, Naples, 1977, Frs. 15-33. 
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with Plato’s Symposium and with the whole saga of the fraught relationship 
between Socrates and Alcibiades, might be setting up here a contrast between 
the two cases, to the advantage of Xenocrates? Xenocrates captivates the 
riotous young Polemon, and he stays captivated; Alcibiades, captivated 
though he was also, sadly and notoriously, did not stay faithful. 
Another curious detail also provided by Antigonus (DL IV 17) seems to 
set up a further resonance. He tells us that Polemon’s wife (he must therefore 
have been at least in his late twenties when he barged into Xenocrates’ 
seminar) actually sued him for cruelty (she brought a dike kakôseôs against 
him), by reason of his inconsiderate lifestyle, ‘chasing after boys’ (hôs 
meirakiois synonta). We know (from Plutarch’s Life of Alcibiades, 8. 3-4), and 
presumably therefore Antigonus and/or his sources also knew, that 
Alcibiades’ wife brought an identical case against him, for similar reasons. It 
rather looks to me as if someone is setting up Polemon here as a sort of 
‘successful’ version of Alcibiades: Xenocrates’ teaching stuck in a way that 
Socrates’ did not – and perhaps that would be because Xenocrates’ teaching 
was dogmatic, while Socrates’ was aporetic. 
 
But such speculations are perhaps somewhat far-fetched. Let us return 
to the biographical record. Once Polemon had been converted – an event 
which must, I think, have occurred no later than 320, if not earlier, if he is to 
be in a position to succeed Xenocrates as head of school in 314 – his lifestyle 
changed dramatically, and he became noted for his unalterable sobriety. 
Antigonus tells us (DL IV 17) that “from the time when he began to study 
philosophy, he acquired such firmness of character (tosouton epiteinai to êthos) 
as always to maintain the same unruffled calm of demeanour.” This plainly 
was particularly impressive to all who knew him. His colleague Crantor, 
when asked what especially attracted him to Polemon, is said to have replied, 
“The fact that I never heard him raise or lower his voice in speaking” (ibid. 
24). There is further the remarkable story of his remaining quite calm after 
being bitten by a mad dog, despite the general uproar which surrounded the 
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incident. We must presume that the dog was not really rabid -- otherwise 
even philosophic calm would not have prevented a deeply unpleasant death 
from rabies; but the story plainly imprinted itself upon the public 
consciousness. 
He was not, nonetheless, impervious to personal affections. Though we 
always need to take with a grain of salt the readiness of philosophical 
biographers to describe a given philosopher’s favourite disciple or chosen 
successor as their ‘beloved’ (erômenos, paidika), Polemon’s attachment to his 
favourite pupil Crates, who ultimately succeeded him, was plainly very close. 
We are told (ibid. 21) that “the two so loved each other that they not only 
shared the same pursuits (epitêdeumata), but grew more and more alike to 
their latest breath, and in death shared the same tomb.” Arcesilaus, who 
succeeded Crates as head of the Academy, and is himself described (probably 
by Antigonus, ibid. 22) as being the erômenos of Crantor, spoke of them as 
being “sort of gods, or left-overs from the Golden Race” (theoi tines ê leipsana 
tôn ek tou khrysou genous), a compliment the exact significance of which is not 
entirely easy to unravel, and which may possibly embody just a touch of 
irony. In the living arrangements of the senior members of the school, as 
reported by Antigonus, Polemon lived with Crates in the house of a certain 
Lysicles, while Arcesilaus lived with Crantor. One would like to be able to 
claim Polemon as one of the very few Platonist philosophers who is attested 
as having been married,8 but presumably his unfortunate wife (if she is not 
just a figment of anecdotage) had been let go before his conversion to 
philosophy; his affections after his conversion seem to be confined to those of 
his own sex. 
 
However, it is time now to focus on what we might be able to identify as 
his philosophical position. To begin with ethics, one might perhaps conclude 
from the details that we have of his way of life that Polemon is approaching 
                                                 
8 The only others that I can think of being Plutarch and, in a very highminded and restricted sense, 
Porphyry. 
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near to the later ideal of the Stoic Sage, and this may indeed be significant. 
His notable impassivity is, of course, a characteristic which he shares with his 
mentor Xenocrates, and from the later perspective of Antiochus their ethical 
positions are closely allied, asserting the overwhelming superiority of virtue 
for the achieving of happiness, but not rejecting the role of the ‘lower’ goods, 
goods of the body and external goods, as being instrumental in its perfection.  
We may accept, I think, the (probable)9 testimony of Antiochus, via 
Cicero in De Finibus II 33-4, that Polemon, following Xenocrates, had already 
put forward a formulation akin to the Stoic doctrine of ‘self-conciliation’ 
(oikeiôsis), as the basis for a system of ethics: 
“Every living creature, from the moment of birth, loves itself and 
all its parts; primarily this self-regard embraces the two main divisions 
of mind and body, and subsequently the parts of each of these. Both 
mind and body have certain excellences; of these the young animal 
grows vaguely conscious, and later begins to discriminate, and to seek 
for the primary endowments of nature and shun their opposites… And 
this is the fountain-head from which one’s whole theory of goods and 
evils must necessarily flow. Polemon, and also before him Aristotle, held 
that the primary objects were the ones I have just mentioned. Thus arose 
the doctrine of the Old Academy and of the Peripatetics, maintaining 
that the end of goods is to live in accordance with nature, that is to enjoy 
the primary things granted by nature (prima a natura data = ta prôta kata 
physin) with the accompaniment of virtue.” (trans. Rackham) 
It is interesting here that Polemon is not linked, as so often elsewhere, with 
Xenocrates, but rather with Aristotle (the Aristotle of the exoteric works, 
necessarily, not the esoteric works available to us), and that may be significant 
of some slight distinction between Polemon and his Master – but one must 
                                                 
9 I say ‘probable’, because unfortunately Antiochus is not mentioned by name in this context, and I 
note that, in the Appendix to the Philosophy of Antiochus volume (p. 334), David Sedley has decided to 
exclude the passage from his list of testimonies (contra Mette, for whom it is Fr. 9a). I just do not 
believe that Cicero has any other sources of information on the Old Academy – that is, that he would 
bother using – so that Antiochus has to be at the back of this, 
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reflect that it is Xenocrates and Aristotle that are credited, in a later passage 
(Book IV 15-18), with a very similar theory, so there may not be much in that. 
We seem to have here, at any rate, the outline of a fairly distinctive Old 
Academic theory of the genesis and nature of an ethical system, from which 
(at least the exoteric) Aristotle does not dissent. It is based on an anticipation 
of the Stoic theory of oikeiôsis, according to which the rational living being, 
building on the instincts of self-preservation common to all living beings, 
progressively develops an understanding of the true nature of the excellence 
(aretê) proper to him, which consists in the fullest possible development of the 
goods of the soul, which are the virtues, together with a proper appreciation 
of the – greatly inferior, but still instrumentally necessary – goods of the body 
and external goods. This, for Antiochus, is the correct theory, as developed in 
the Old Academy, in particular by Xenocrates and Polemon. The Stoics are 
criticized for taking up a position that is too austere, denying the status of 
goods of any sort to the lower two levels of Platonist good, the ‘human 
goods’, as they are termed in the Laws (I 631BC),10 and substituting a rather 
waffling category of ‘preferred indifferents’. And as a counterweight to this 
criticism of Stoic doctrine, Theophrastus, within the Peripatos, is scolded for 
“robbing virtue of her beauty and weakening her strength by denying that the 
happy life (beate vivere) is based in her alone.”11 
For Xenocrates and Polemon, therefore, it is not required or desirable 
that the human being totally transcend ta prôta kata physin; it is enough simply 
to discern clearly how they are to be subordinated to the acquisition of the 
virtues. That said, can we discern any differences of emphasis between master 
and pupil on this fundamental question? I think that we can, and for that we 
need to turn to two testimonia of Clement of Alexandria, who presents in the 
                                                 
10 Antiochus, indeed, is reported at Fin. V 28 as taking a dig at Chrysippus for so framing his ethics as 
to present man as being, not a mind in a body, but a mind without a body! Varro, in his De 
Philosophia, as quoted by Augustine at CD XIX 3, states the Antiochian position – and therefore 
Antiochus’ view of the Old Academic position – very clearly and well, highlighting the dual nature of 
man. 
11 This, as I will argue, is probably a Polemonian, rather than a Xenocratean, criticism of 
Theophrastus. 
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Stromateis (II 22 = Fr. 77 H/232 IP) accounts of the definitions of eudaimonia by 
Xenocrates and Polemon respectively. First Xenocrates: 
“Xenocrates of Chalcedon defines happiness (eudaimonia) as the 
acquisition of the virtue proper to us and of the resources with which to 
service it. Then as regards the proper seat (en hôi) of this, he plainly says 
the soul; as the motive causes of it (hyph’ hôn) he identifies the virtues; as 
the material causes (ex hôn), in the sense of parts, noble actions and good 
habits and attitudes (hexeis te kai diatheseis); and as indispensable 
accompaniments (hôn ouk aneu), bodily and external goods.” 
I don’t wish to dwell on this in great detail in the present context, since 
we are primarily concerned with Polemon, but we may note in particular the 
status of the bodily and external goods as hôn ouk aneu, situating them as 
thoroughly inferior and subordinate to the virtues, certainly, but on the other 
hand as necessary underpinnings of the happy life. 
When we turn to Polemon, though, in the same source, what do we 
find? 
“Polemon, the associate of Xenocrates, seems to wish happiness to 
consist in self-sufficiency (autarkeia) in respect of all good things, or at 
least the most and greatest of them. For he lays it down that happiness 
can never be achieved apart from virtue, while virtue is sufficient for 
happiness even if bereft of bodily and external goods.” 
May we not discern here a significant shift in emphasis – provided, of 
course, that we can trust Clement’s basic accuracy? I think that we may, and 
that it sets up Polemon as a plausible antecedent of Stoic austerity. This report 
seems to indicate that, even though Polemon may have recognized some 
subsidiary role in the achieving of eudaimonia for the lower goods, he makes 
the important assertion that virtue alone is sufficient for its attainment. It is 
notable, certainly, that if we were entirely dependent on Antiochus, via 
Cicero, for our information, we would not derive a clear impression of 
divergence between Xenocrates and Polemon on this issue, but then it was by 
no means in Antiochus’ interest to stress differences between the veteres,  
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seeing as they communally possessed the whole truth. Fortunately, though, 
we are not entirely dependent on him for our information. We may assume, I 
think, that virtually the only respect in which Polemon differed from his pupil 
Zeno was in maintaining the status of the lower two classes of good as goods, 
not simply ‘indifferents’ (adiaphora). 
 
That Polemon should have had a distinctive ethical theory, then, largely 
anticipating that of the Stoics, may be accepted as reasonable. Much more 
controversial, however, is the question as to whether he had developed a 
distinctive physical theory that might also serve as an anticipation of Stoicism. 
Nonetheless, there seems to me to be some evidence on the question that 
should not be dismissed. 
There is not much to go on here, certainly, but there is at least one straw 
in the wind, in the shape of a bald doxographic report from Aetius, preserved 
in Stobaeus (just prior to a much more elaborate report on the theology of 
Xenocrates), declaring that “Polemon declared that the cosmos is God” 
(Polemon ton kosmon theon apephênato). Now it might be thought that this need 
only means that Polemon thought that the cosmos was a god, which would 
not be of great interest. However, the context in which it occurs excludes that. 
The whole section in Stobaeus is concerned with the nature and functions of 
the supreme principle, not of any subordinate or partial divinity, so this must 
give Polemon’s views on that subject. 
The question is, how outlandish or outrageous would such a position be 
in the context of the Old Academy? Somewhat surprising, perhaps, but I 
would argue that his doctrine here can be viewed as being in line with certain 
other tendencies that had been manifesting themselves within the Academy 
since shortly after Plato’s death. I think particularly here of such a figure as 
Philip of Opus, who in the Epinomis (which I take to be his production, rather 
than a senile effusion of the aged Plato) plainly presents an immanent rational 
World Soul as the supreme principle in the universe (cf. e.g. 981B-E, 983 CD, 
988C-E), the workings of whose mind we may study by pursuing astronomy 
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(976Dff.), which thus seems to supplant dialectic as the supreme science. It is 
not clear, certainly, what Philip considers might be the composition of this 
World Soul – sc. whether it is assumed to be immaterial, or rather composed 
of some distinctively fine substance such as aether – but we know that his 
contemporary Heraclides of Pontus held that the human soul – and no doubt 
the world soul – was composed of aether, being of the same substance as the 
heavenly bodies (Fr. 99 Wehrli). Indeed, if we look closely at certain details of 
te doctrine of Xenocrates, we note, first of all , that – unlike Plato himself, who 
remains studiously vague on the question – he is prepared to identify the 
dodecahedron (of the basic Platonic bodies set out in the Timaeus, 55Aff.), 
with aether, as the substance of the heavens (accepting Aristotle’s position on 
this).  
Again, in Aetius’ summary of Xenocrates’ theology, which is to be found 
in Stobaeus immediately following the cryptic sentence on Polemon, 
Xenocrates is presented as postulating his supreme active principle, the Nous-
Monad as “reigning in the heavens” (en ouranôi basileuousan). This phrase is 
plainly inspired by the description of Zeus in the myth of the Phaedrus (246E), 
and could be regarded are merely figurative, but it need not be. I would 
suggest that Xenocrates in fact viewed his supreme principle, not as 
transcendent, but rather as occupying the highest part of the heavens – the 
realm of the fixed stars – and directing the universe from there. What is not 
yet clear is precisely what the Nous-Monad is composed of, and indication 
are that he remained true to Plato’s doctrine as to the immateriality of 
spiritual substances. At any rate, there is an interesting remark in Cicero’s 
Academica Posteriora, §39, where Varro, representing Antiochus, portrays Zeno 
as dissenting from his immediate predecessors in the Academy as to the 
existence of aether as a fifth substance, in favour of a pure form of fire: 
“He laid it down that the natural substance that was the parent of 
all things, even of the senses and the mind, was fire. He also differed 
from the same thinkers in holding that an incorporeal substance, such as 
Xenocrates and the older thinkers also had pronounced the mind to be, 
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was incapable of any activity, whereas anything capable of acting or 
being acted upon in any way could not be incorporeal.” 
I find this a significant passage in many ways. Varro does not mention 
Polemon here, though usually he is linked with Xenocrates, and he refers to 
Xenocrates et superiores, not the Old Academy in general (which he would 
normally refer to as the veteres). I would take this as a devious way of 
indicating – Antiochus would not wish to highlight a difference of position 
among the veteres – that in fact Polemon did not maintain that the supreme 
principle was incorporeal. If Polemon did accept that the substance of the 
supreme principle was aether, then Zeno still has a quarrel with him, since he 
dismissed the Aristotelian and Old Academic postulate of aether as a fudge – 
a so-called ‘fifth element’ that was presented as a quasi-immaterial entity – 
and plumped firmly for a pure form of fire. 
In fact, of course, the Zenonian pyr tekhnikon turns out to be just as 
peculiar as aether, and not at all like ordinary sublunar fire, but this assertion 
has enabled Zeno to differentiate himself satisfactorily from his Old Academic 
mentors, in particular Polemon, and assert a distinctive ‘materialist’ position, 
even as in ethics he differentiated himself by downgrading the ‘mortal goods’ 
to the status of ‘indifferents’, and thus claimed the moral high ground there – 
before letting back them in as ‘preferred indifferents’. Such are the strategies 
necessary for founding a school of one’s own! 
 
In conclusion, I think that we can rescue Polemon to some extent from 
the status of being merely a grosse Schatten. He was plainly a notable 
character, but he also, I would maintain, made some distinctive contributions 
to Old Academic doctrine. It is undeniable, though, that that is not what he 
was most remembered for, at least if we may trust Diogenes Laertius. Let us 
just end with a few more anecdotal details, to round off our picture of the 
man. 
The first one that I select (IV 19) is one of which I must confess I do not 
entirely grasp the significance. “He would not, as they say, even sit down to 
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deal with the themes of his pupils (pros tas theseis), but would argue walking 
up and down.” This seems to have some connection with his being ‘refined 
and generous’ (asoloikos kai gennaios), as specified just above, so it is 
presumably an indication of his informal and companionable style of 
teaching, but I fail to see how that helps from a pedagogical point of view.  
Another detail is somewhat clearer in implication, though still not 
entirely so (ibid.): Polemon “withdrew from society”, or “became reclusive” 
(ekpepatêkôs)12, and “spent his time in the Garden” (kêpos, which I take to refer 
to Plato’s villa adjacent to the Academy park), so that his pupils took to 
constructing little huts (kalybia) for themselves in the grounds, not far from 
the shrine of the Muses (mouseion, which I take to be the spiritual focus of the 
School) and the lecture-hall (exedra).13 If we could properly unravel the 
implications of this report, it would tell us something about the physical 
structure and organization of the School, as well as about the peculiarities of 
the Scholarch. We know of the Mouseion from the report, again in Diogenes 
(IV 1), about Speusippus, that “he set up statues of the Graces in the Mouseion 
erected by Plato in the Academy”. This makes it sound as if the Mouseion was 
situated in the Academy Park, rather than in the kêpos, but Diogenes may not 
have known where it was. At any rate, wherever the Mouseion was, there was 
the exedra also, and there also were the huts of the students, so I would 
suggest that they were all in the kêpos. I am not familiar with the regulations 
on overnight camping in public parks in Athens in the fourth century B.C., 
but I doubt that such activity would have been tolerated. Polemon himself, as 
we have seen, did not actually live in the kêpos, but (with Crates) in the house 
of Lysicles. We must suppose, however, that this was not far away. 
The final report that I would like to dwell on is one that reveals an 
interestingly positive attitude on Polemon’s part to the poets – considering 
                                                 
12 Ekpateô, used four times by Diogenes, once of Epimenides (I 112), here of Polemon, once of 
Heraclitus (IX 3), and once of Pyrrho of Elis (IX 63), seems to have the general connotation of  
‘retreating into solitude’, or ‘withdrawing from society’. It places Polemon in curious company. 
13 I have discussed the problem of the physical dispositions of the Academy in more detail in ‘What 
Happened to Plato’s Garden?’ (Hermathena 133 (1983), pp. 51-9 = The Golden Chain, Essay 1), but 
without, I fear, solving all the difficulties. 
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the well-known strictures of Plato himself. Polemon, we learn (IV 20), was a 
great admirer of Sophocles – seemingly, if we may so interpret the rather 
cryptic explanation given by Diogenes, in particular the austere ethical 
sentiments expressed in the plays. He liked to term Homer the Sophocles of 
epic, and Sophocles the Homer of tragedy. I would suggest that this more 
positive attitude to tragedy may be indicative of the development within the 
later Academy of a theory – allowed for already, it must be said, in Plato’s 
Phaedrus – of a ‘higher’ form of poetry, composed by poets who have acquired 
a vision of the truth, and who thus escape the strictures of Plato, who 
condemns the poets for the mimesis of appearances, and thus being three 
degrees from the truth. This of course assumes that Sophocles can be 
regarded as such a poet, but after all Plato allows Socrates to speak well in 
general of Sophocles; it was rather Euripides to whom he objected.14 
At any rate, there, I think, we may leave the fourth head of the 
Academy, having, I hope, fleshed out to some extent the rather skeletal image 
of him that has been transmitted to posterity. 
                                                 
14 His colleague Crantor, we may note (DL IV 26), is said to have admired Homer and Euripides 
above all other poets, which carries things a stage further. 
